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Abstract
This paper examines the role of judgment shocks in combination with other struc-
tural shocks in explaining post-war economic volatility within the context of a New
Keynesian model. Agents form expectations using constant gain learning then aug-
ment these forecasts with judgment. These judgments may be interpreted as a reaction
to current news stories or policy announcements that would inﬂuence people's expec-
tations. I allow for the possibility that these judgments be informatively based on
information about structural shocks, but judgment itself may also be subject to its
own stochastic shocks. I estimate a standard New Keynesian model that includes these
shocks using Bayesian simulation methods. To aid in identifying expectational shocks
from other structural shocks I include data on professional forecasts along with data
on output gap, inﬂation, and interest rates. I ﬁnd judgment is largely not informed by
macroeconomic fundamentals; most of the variability in judgment is explained by its
own stochastic shocks. Impulse response functions from the estimated model illustrate
how shocks to judgment destabilize the economy and explain business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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1 Introduction
Rational expectations with full information about quantities of relevant state variables and
stochastic shocks is the most common assumption among research using models of the
macroeconomy. The assumption makes solving, evaluating, and estimating macroeconomic
models possible with standard tools (albeit, still rather sophisticated), but the informational
requirements and information processing requirements behind the assumption are rather ex-
treme. Least squares learning is a type of non-rational, adaptive expectations that attempts
to use more realistic forecasting methods within the context of macroeconomic models to
understand macroeconomic dynamics. In such a framework, economic agents gather past
data and use simple least squares time series techniques to form their expectations for future
outcomes before making forward looking decisions (a feasible and rather simple statistical
exercise).
One drawback of least squares learning is that expectations are based only on collections
of past data that are passed through some statistical procedure. Forward looking decisions
might also be well guided by relevant current events that have not yet made themselves evi-
dent in historical data. Examples of such events include the passing of a new law, a natural
disaster, a change in political landscape, a change in international trade patterns, or news
of a recent technological development, just to name a few. As soon as such events are made
known through the media, optimizing economic agents would do well to immediately change
their expectations and decisions accordingly. One could argue that rational expectations
captures this realistic component of expectations formation that learning does not. Typi-
cally in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with rational expectations,
the values for current stochastic shocks are known before expectations are made. We can
interpret the quantities for these stochastic shocks as precisely measured impacts the above
events on the macroeconomy.
It might also happen that current events are misinterpreted, the quantiﬁed impact is
misjudged, or that judgment is otherwise misinformed and not based on actual events. One
example of an exaggerated news story in recent U.S. history might be the Y2K computer
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bug widely discussed in the late 1990s. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be
an example of a very real event, but whose implications to economic activity may have been
overestimated. Rational expectations cannot account for such misinterpretations of news of
this type.
Judgment based on information in the news that is impractical or impossible to quantify
may therefore beneﬁt optimal decision making, be detrimental, or more probably a combi-
nation of both. I examine within the context of a standard stochastic New Keynesian model
expectations that are formed by least squares learning forecasts and are then augmented
by judgment. The least squares forecasts incorporates historical data on the output gap,
inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate, data that can be readily obtained and which are
informative for expectations within the context of the New Keynesian model. If expectations
were rational and agents had full information, they would also use current realizations of
structural shocks in forming expectations. In the learning environment with judgment, val-
ues for structural shocks cannot be obtained or estimated, but judgments based on news and
current events may incorporate some of this information. Judgment may also be subject to
its own stochastic shocks that are independent to all other shocks and state variables. This
stochastic component of judgment can be viewed as the detrimental component to using
judgment; shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals aﬀect agents expectations
and forward looking decisions. One of the contributions of this paper is to provide an es-
timate for the degree to which judgment has inﬂuenced expectations in the post-war U.S.
monetary economy, and how much of this judgment is informative (that is, related to cur-
rent realizations of structural shocks) and how much is disruptive (independent of structural
shocks). I further illustrate the inﬂuence judgment shocks have had on the dynamics of
inﬂation, output, and interest rates in U.S. history, along with traditional supply, demand,
and monetary policy shocks.
Before moving forward, it is prudent to deﬁne the following terms used in this paper that
I give precise meanings to, perhaps using these somewhat diﬀerently than other papers in
the literature:
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Expectation: the value agents actually expect a variable to take in the future. This will be
the sum of agents' econometric forecast and their judgment. When taking the model to
the data, expectations are matched to median responses from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.
Econometric forecast : a forecast for a future variable computed using least squares methods
and past data on the output gap, inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate.
Judgment : sometimes referred to as add-factors in the literature. A value that is added
to agents' econometric forecasts to reﬂect their actual expectations of what is to come.
Judgment is a linear combination of structural shocks and judgment shocks.
Structural shocks or fundamental shocks : traditional stochastic shocks in the New Keynesian
model: a natural rate shock, a cost shock, and a monetary policy shock. Current values
of structural shocks aﬀect macroeconomic dynamics but they have no inﬂuence on
agents' econometric forecasts. They may, however, inﬂuence judgment.
Judgment shocks : stochastic shocks to judgment that are independent of the structural
shocks.
2 Related Literature
The literature on learning speciﬁc to monetary economics can be broadly put into two cat-
egories: 1) theoretical work that examines stability of equilibria under learning versus ra-
tional expectations, and 2) empirical and descriptive research that examines the diﬀerence
in macroeconomic dynamics between learning and rational expectations. The ﬁrst branch
explores the conditions for expectational stability, or E-stability, on monetary policy pa-
rameters. A model with learning that is E-stable will have expectations that converge to
the rational expectations equilibrium, within the neighborhood of the rational expectations
solution. Examples papers of this type are numerous, but include Bullard and Mitra (2002)
and (2007), Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and (2003b), and Preston (2005), just to name
a few. These papers demonstrate that conditions on monetary policy for E-stability can be
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diﬀerent and more restrictive than conditions for determinacy (the relevant condition when
expectations are rational); the implication is that the economy can become unstable and
volatile if monetary policy strays from these restrictions.
Such concerns have motivated the second branch of literature which investigates whether
learning can explain macroeconomic dynamics we see in the data that is not well explained by
traditional rational expectations models. Orphanides and Williams (2005b) use a calibrated
model with learning to demonstrate that transient inﬂation shocks can lead to inﬂation
scares, prolonged periods of high inﬂation. Findings like these suggests that learning can
explain macroeconomic persistence. Milani (2007) ﬁnds evidence for this with an estimated
New Keynesian model with learning. He ﬁnds learning can explain persistence in inﬂation
and output without the need for common mechanical sources of persistence, such as habit
formation and inﬂation indexation which are typically augmented to rational expectations
models. Learning has also been used to explain characteristics of the Great Inﬂation
and Great Moderation, the large run-up of inﬂation and macroeconomic volatility in the
1970s followed by a long period of relatively moderate volatility and low inﬂation since 1984.
Examples of such papers include Orphanides and Williams (2005a), Primiceri (2006), Bullard
and Eusepi (2005), and Bullard and Singh (2007).
Preceding this paper, relatively little work has investigated the importance of judgment
on expectations. Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) and Svensson (2005) demon-
strate the usefulness of judgment for central bankers when making monetary policy decisions.
Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2008) and (2010) incorporate judgment of the kind that is
purely disruptive (judgments depend exclusively on stochastic shocks that are independent
of economic fundamentals) into simple monetary models and demonstrate that judgment
can create exuberance equilibria, a condition that is susceptible to self-fulﬁlling judgments
even when an equilibrium is otherwise locally determinant and/or E-stable. They go on to
suggest appropriate monetary policy to prevent such unstable outcomes.
These papers by Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja fall into the ﬁrst branch of learning
literature mentioned above: they provide theoretical evidence that expectations formed by
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judgment and learning can lead to economic instability. The present work is the ﬁrst attempt
to bring the issue to the second branch: to determine whether judgment with learning can
explain characteristics of business cycle ﬂuctuations seen in data for the post-war United
States.
3 Model
Learning and judgment are examined within the context of a standard New Keynesian model,
a model that has been estimated at great length with rational expectations and learning to
investigate the roles stochastic shocks play in explaining macroeconomic dynamics.1 In this
section I describe the background and log-linearization of a rational expectations version of
the model. In the next section rational expectations are replaced with expectations formed
with learning and judgment.2
The model consists of three sectors that describe consumer behavior, producer behav-
ior under imperfectly ﬂexible prices, and monetary policy. Optimal consumer behavior is
described by with a set of equations that determine current consumption based on past
consumption, interest rates, and expectations of future consumption and future inﬂation.
Producer behavior is modeled with a Phillips curve which predicts the inﬂation rate that
arises from ﬁrm's optimal pricing strategies when subject to a pricing friction. The ﬁnal
sector is monetary policy, which I assume to follow a standard Taylor rule where the central
bank sets a nominal interest rate which responds to expectations of future output and in-
ﬂation. These equations jointly determine the dynamics of the output gap (the percentage
diﬀerence between real GDP and potential GDP), the inﬂation rate, and the nominal interest
rate.
1Notable examples using rational expectations include Ireland (2004a) and (2004b), Nason and Smith
(2005), and Smets and Wouters (2003), (2005), and (2007), just to name a few. Examples of estimated
DSGE models with learning include Milani (2007), Slobodyan and Wouters (2007) and (2008).
2This is perhaps the most common way to incorporate learning into dynamic macroeconomic models.
However, as Marcet and Sargent (1989) point out and Preston (2005) further demonstrates, this method is
not consistent with learning in the microfoundations of the model because the least squares expectations
operator does not follow the law of iterated expectations, a property that is assumed when solving the model.
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3.1 Consumers
There are a continuum of consumer types and a continuum of intermediate good producers,
each on the unit interval. Each consumer type has a speciﬁc type of labor skill that can
only be hired by a corresponding intermediate good ﬁrm. It is assumed that there many
consumers of each type so that no consumer has market power over their wage. Moreover,
it is assumed that there are the same number of consumers in each type, so that the output
levels of intermediate goods do not depend on the distribution of consumer types. Diﬀerent
intermediate goods ﬁrms may pay diﬀerent wages, so labor income may be diﬀerent for
each consumer type. To simplify the model, it is further assumed that there is a perfect
asset market so despite diﬀerences in labor income, all consumers choose the same level of
consumption.
Each consumer of type i ∈ (0, 1) chooses consumption, ct, labor supply, nt(i), and pur-
chases of real government bonds, bt(i), to maximize lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 1
1− 1
σ
ξt (ct − ηct−1)1−
1
σ − 1
1 + 1
µ
nt(i)
1+ 1
µ
 , (1)
subject to the budget constraint,
ct + bt(i) =
1 + rt−1
1 + pit
bt−1(i) +
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + Πt − τt. (2)
where ξt is an aggregate preference shock, wt(i)/pt is the real wage paid to type i labor; Πt is
the total value of proﬁts consumers earn by owning stock in ﬁrms, and τt is the real value of
lump sum taxes. The preference parameters are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
denoted by σ ∈ (0,∞); the elasticity of labor supply, denoted by µ ∈ (0,∞); and the degree
of habit formation, denoted by η ∈ [0, 1). When the degree of habit formation is greater
than zero, consumers' utility from current consumption depends on their previous level of
consumption. Habit formation introduces persistence in consumption, and therefore output,
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which is commonly found in empirical studies of DSGE models.3
Log-linearizing consumers' ﬁrst order conditions leads to the following log-linear Euler
equation,
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1, (3)
where λˆt is the percentage deviation from the steady state of the Lagrange multiplier on
the budget constraint, (2), and is therefore interpreted as the marginal utility of real in-
come. A hat indicates the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state.4 Utility
maximization leads to the following log-linear marginal utility of income,
λˆt =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEtcˆt+1 − σ(1 + βη2)cˆt + σηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
. (4)
The marginal utility of income, (4), and the Euler equation, (3), make up the IS sector of
the model.
3.2 Producers
There is one ﬁnal good used for consumption which is sold in a perfectly competitive market
and produced with a continuum of intermediate goods according to the production function,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, (5)
where yt is the output of the ﬁnal good, yt(i) is the output of intermediate good i, and
θ ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitution in production. Proﬁt maximization leads to the
3For example, Smets and Wouters (2005) ﬁnd point estimates of habit formation close to unity. Fur-
thermore, Fuhrer (2000) ﬁnds that habit formation leads to hump-shaped impulse response functions, a
characteristic commonly supported by U.S. and European data. Milani (2007) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant degree
of habit formation, but only under rational expectations. When estimating the model with constant gain
learning, he ﬁnds an estimate for the degree of habit formation close to zero.
4A hat is omitted from pit because it is necessary to assume the steady state level of inﬂation is equal to
zero when deriving the log-linear supply relationship.
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following demand for each intermediate good,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt, (6)
where pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i and pt is the price of the ﬁnal good. Substi-
tuting equation (6) into equation (5) leads to the following expression for the price of the
ﬁnal good in terms of the prices of intermediate goods,
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (7)
Each intermediate good is sold in a monopolistically competitive market and is produced
according to the production function, yt(i) = ztnt(i), where zt is an aggregate technology
shock. It can be shown that intermediate goods ﬁrms' optimal choices for labor demand and
labor market clearing leads to the following aggregate log-linear marginal cost,
ψˆt =
1
µ
yˆt − λˆt −
(
1
µ
+ 1
)
zˆt. (8)
Firm's pricing conditions are subject to the Calvo (1983) pricing friction, where only a
constant fraction of ﬁrms are able to re-optimize their price in a given period. The ﬁrms
that are able to re-optimize their price is randomly determined, completely independently of
ﬁrms' prices or any other characteristics or history. I suppose that ﬁrms who are not able to
re-optimize their price do adjust their price by a fraction, γ ∈ [0, 1), of the previous period's
inﬂation rate. A positive degree of price indexation introduces a source of persistence in
inﬂation which is often found to be statistically signiﬁcant when estimating New Keynesian
models (see for example, Smets and Wouters (2003), (2005), (2007), and Milani (2007)).
Let ω ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of ﬁrms that are not able to re-optimize their prices
every period. Since these ﬁrms are randomly determined, ωT is the probability that a ﬁrm
will not be able to re-optimize its price for T consecutive periods. A ﬁrm who is able to
re-optimize chooses its price to maximize the following present discounted utility value of
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proﬁts earned while the ﬁrm is unable to re-optimize its price again:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
{(
pt(i)pi
∗
t+T
pt+T
)
yt+T (i)−Ψ [yt+T (i)]
}
, (9)
where Ψ [yt+T (i)] is the real total cost function of producing yt+T (i) units, given the optimal
decision for labor, and pi∗t+T ≡
∏T
j=1(1+γpit+j−1) is degree to which the ﬁrm's price is able to
adjust according to inﬂation indexation. It can be shown that the ﬁrst order condition for
pt(i) combined with the ﬁnal good price index, equation (7), leads to the log-linear Phillips
equation,5
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
µ(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(µ+ θ)
ψˆt
]
. (10)
3.3 Fully Flexible Prices
The IS equations and Phillips equation can be re-written in terms of the diﬀerence from the
outcome under fully ﬂexible prices. This allows the model to be taken to data on the output
gap, the percentage deviation of real GDP from real potential GDP, as measured by the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce.
Let y˜t = yˆt − yˆft and λ˜t = λˆt − λˆft denote the percentage deviation of output and
marginal utility from their fully ﬂexible price outcomes, where a superscript f denotes the
outcome under fully ﬂexible prices. Under ﬂexible prices the linearized Euler equation, (3),
and marginal utility of income, (4), still hold. Using these conditions and imposing goods
market clearing that consumption is equal to output implies,
λ˜t = Etλ˜t+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 − rnt , (11)
λ˜t =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEty˜t+1 − σ(1 + βη2)y˜t + σηy˜t−1
]
, (12)
where rnt is the percentage deviation of the natural interest rate from its steady state. The
natural interest rate is the interest rate that would occur under fully ﬂexible prices. I
5It is assumed during the log-linearization that there is a steady state for the price level, which implicitly
assumes the steady state level of inﬂation is equal to zero.
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suppose that rnt follows the stochastic exogenous process,
rnt = ρnr
n
t−1 + n,t, (13)
where n,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
When prices are fully ﬂexible, it can be shown that intermediate goods ﬁrms will all
choose the same price in a given period, and the marginal cost of production is constant,
and therefore always will be equal to its steady state value. Under fully ﬂexible prices,
equation (8) implies,
ψˆft =
1
µ
yˆft − λˆft −
(
1
µ
+ 1
)
zˆt = 0.
One can solve this equation for zˆt and substitute it back into the equation for marginal
cost, (8). Plugging this expression for marginal cost into equation (10) yields the following
Phillips curve in terms of the output gap,
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(µ+ θ)
(y˜t − µλ˜t)
]
.
While this expression for the Phillips curve is not subject to a structural shock, when esti-
mating the model it is convenient to have a shock here to avoid the problem of stochastic
singularity. The Phillips curve is amended with a cost shock so the form to be estimated is
given by,
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κ(y˜t − µλ˜t) + ut
]
, (14)
where κ is the reduced form coeﬃcient on the marginal cost and ut is the exogenous cost
shock that evolves according to,
ut = ρuut−1 + u,t, (15)
where u,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
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3.4 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate is determined jointly with output and inﬂation by monetary policy.
In this paper I assume the monetary authority follows a Taylor (1993) type rule where the
interest rate is set in response to expected output and expected inﬂation, with a preference
for interest rate smoothing, according to,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) (ψpiEtpit+1 + ψyEty˜t+1) + r,t (16)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of exogenous interest rate persistence, ψpi ∈ (0,∞) is the
degree to which monetary policy responds to expectations of future inﬂation, ψy ∈ (0,∞)
is the degree to which monetary policy responds to the expected output gap, and r,t is an
independently and identically distributed exogenous monetary policy shock with mean zero
and variance given by σ2r .
Alternative policy rules may replace expected inﬂation and output with current or lagged
realizations. For example, McCallum (1997) argues that a policy rule that depends on current
realizations of output and inﬂation does not accurately depict actual information available
to central banks when monetary policy decisions are made, since it takes about a full quarter
to produce actual data on real GDP and price levels. He argues that the monetary policy
rule should instead be expressed as a function of past data. The Taylor rule in (16) is subject
to this criticism under rational expectations, since rational expectations depend on current
realizations of state variables and shocks. It is shown in the next section, however, that
expectations formed by least squares learning are functions of only past data.
3.5 Complete Model
The complete linear New Keynesian model is represented by the IS relationship, given in
equations (11) and (12); the Phillips curve in equation (14), and the Taylor rule in equation
(16). These equations determine the dynamics of the output gap (y˜t), the marginal utility of
income gap (λ˜t), the inﬂation rate (pit), and the interest rate (rˆt). The model so far is subject
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to three structural shocks: the natural rate shock, the cost push shock, and the monetary
policy shock.
4 Expectations
4.1 Learning
The log-linearized model in the previous section can be expressed in the general form:
Ω0xt = Ω1xt−1 + Ω2xet+1 + Ω2x
e
t+2 + Ψzt, (17)
zt = Azt−1 + t (18)
where the notation xet+1 has replaced Etxt+1 to denote possibly non-rational expectations; xt
is a vector of minimum state variables, given by xt = [y˜t pit rˆt]
′, and zt is a vector of structural
shocks, given by zt = [r
n
t ut r,t]
′. The variable λ˜t can be eliminated by substituting equation
(12) into equations (11) and (14), which leads to the inclusion of the two-period ahead
expectation for the output gap, Ety˜t+2, in the IS equation. The minimum state variable
(MSV) solution under rational expectations is given by,
Etxt+1 = Gxt +HEtzt+1, (19)
where the elements of the matrices G and H are a function of the parameters of the model
and may be determined by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Agents that learn do
not know the the parameters that govern the economy, but do use this reduced form as their
forecasting model. Agents' information sets are restricted only to past data on xt, so they
are unable to collect data on past structural shocks to estimate matrix H.
In period t agents are able to assemble data sets only through period t − 1. At this
point the agents estimate G using least squares and use the model to make econometric
forecasts for future output and inﬂation. There is no constant term in the general form of
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the model, equation (17), or in the rational expectation, given in equation (19), since all
variables are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from the steady state or ﬂexible
price outcome. Since agents are not endowed with information about the parameters of the
model to determine steady state values, it is realistic to suppose that agents also estimate
a constant term in equation (19). Let Gˆ∗t denote agents' time t estimate for the columns
of matrix G and a column for a constant term so that Gˆ∗t = [gˆt Gˆt], where gˆt is the time t
estimate of the constant term.
If agents use ordinary least squares (OLS), then,
(
Gˆ∗t
)′
=
(
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
x∗τ−1x
∗
τ−1
′
)−1 (
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
x∗τ−1x
′
τ
)
, (20)
where x∗
′
t = [1 x
′
t] is the vector of explanatory variables including the constant. This equation
can be conveniently rewritten in the following recursive form:
Gˆ∗t = Gˆ
∗
t−1 + gt(xt−1 − Gˆ∗t−1x∗t−2)x∗t−2′R−1t , (21)
Rt = Rt−1 + gt(x∗t−2x
∗
t−2
′ −Rt−1), (22)
where gt = 1/(t− 1) is the learning gain.6 The recursive form shows precisely how expecta-
tions are adaptive. The term enclosed in parentheses in equation (21) is the realized forecast
error using the previous estimate Gˆ∗t−1. The degree to which agents adjust their expectations
depends on the size of this forecast error, the variance of the estimated coeﬃcients, captured
by the inverse of matrix Rt, and the size of the learning gain, gt. The larger is the learning
gain, the more expectations respond to the latest forecast error. When agents use OLS, gt
approaches zero as time approaches inﬁnity. Under constant gain learning, gt remains at
some constant level, g, so the degree to which new observations can aﬀect expectations is
always the same.
Agents use the least squares estimate of the coeﬃcients in G to form the econometric
6To show this, let Rt =
1
t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 x
∗
τ−1x
∗′
τ−1 and
(
Gˆ∗t
)′
= R−1t
(
1
t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 x
∗
τ−2x
′
τ−1
)
.
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forecasts,
E∗t xt+1 = gˆt + GˆtE
∗
t xt = (I + Gˆt)gˆt + Gˆ
2
txt−1,
E∗t xt+2 = gˆt + GˆtE
∗
t xt+1 =
[
I + Gˆt(I + Gˆt)
]
gˆt + Gˆ
3
txt−1,
(23)
where E∗t denotes expectation that is equal to the econometric forecast.
4.2 Judgment
Agents are not able to collect realizations of stochastic shocks, zt, in their forecasts.
7 How-
ever, current events may reveal some noisy information about structural shocks, which be-
comes part of judgment when forming expectations. Examples of such events may be the
announcement of technological innovations, natural disasters, onset of war or political in-
stability among trading partners, changes in weather eﬀecting agricultural production, etc.
The news of such events cannot be instantly mapped to data to make econometric fore-
casts, but it is nonetheless valuable information when forming expectations. Let agents'
ﬁnal expectations be the following sum of the econometric forecast given in equation (23)
and judgment,
xet+1 = E
∗
t xt+1 + ηt, (24)
where ηt is an appropriately sized vector whose non-zero elements are values for judgment
concerning the future output gap (ηy,t) and future inﬂation rate (ηpi,t). The judgment vec-
tor depends on current events that includes some information about zt, but it also includes
expectational shocks, its own stochastic component that is independent of economic funda-
7Central banks do use a number of such sophisticated models that incorporate the presence of latent
structural shocks when forming forecasts. Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) and Svensson (2005)
point out that judgment is nonetheless an important component of central bank expectations and decisions.
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mentals. Let judgment evolve according to,
ηt = Φzt + ζt,
ζy,t = ρζ,yζy,t−1 + ξy,t,
ζpi,t = ρζ,piζpi,t−1 + ξpi,t,
(25)
where matrix Φ captures the degree to which judgment successfully picks up information
about structural shocks and ζt is a vector of autocorrelated disturbances to the judgment
variables. The second and third equations allow these disturbances to be autocorrelated
so that agents' ill-informed judgment about a particular variable may persist for multiple
quarters depending on the parameters ρζ,y and ρζ,y. The judgment shocks ξy,t and ξpi,t are
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation given by
σξ,y and σξ,pi, respectively.
The structural form for evolution of judgment in equation (25) is quite general and allows
as special cases common speciﬁcations for expectations in DSGE models. If ρzeta,y = ρζ,y = 0
and V ar(ξy,t) = V ar(ξpi,t) = 0 then expectations are not subject to judgment shocks. If
Φ = 0, then stochastic shocks are always unobservable when forming expectations, which
is a common assumption among empirical learning papers. If Φ = HA, where H is the
coeﬃcient on expected shocks in the MSV solution in equation (19) and A is the degree of
persistence of structural shocks given in (18), then agents are capable of observing quantities
for structural shocks and the inﬂuence these shocks have on expectations is equal to the
rational expectations solution. In fact, the entire model encompasses rational expectations
as a special case when these conditions are met, the learning gain is equal to zero (g = 0),
and the initial condition for learning coeﬃcients, G∗t in equation (21), is consistent with the
MSV solution, G in equation (19). This initial condition is estimated using pre-sample data
as described in the next section, and all other parameters mentioned here are estimated
jointly with the New Keynesian structural parameters, so this framework can be viewed as
quite unrestricted.
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5 Estimation
The model is estimated using U.S. quarterly data from 1968:Q3 through 2007:Q1 on the
output gap (percentage diﬀerence between real GDP reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the measure of potential real GDP from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce), the
inﬂation rate of the GDP deﬂator, and the Federal Funds Rate. Quarterly data from the
same period on one quarter ahead expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
is also used to help identify the parameters of the learning and judgment process. The
median responses were obtained for the one quarter ahead forecast for real GDP and the
GDP deﬂator. The expectation for the output gap is found by computing the percentage
diﬀerence between the forecast for real GDP and the CBO estimate for potential GDP
in the next quarter. The expectation for inﬂation is found by computing the percentage
diﬀerence between the forecast for the GDP deﬂator next period and the current GDP
deﬂator. The base year used for the forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
changes throughout the sample, so the data was ﬁrst appropriately rescaled.
5.1 State Space Representation
Equations (17), (18), (21), (22), (23), and (25) can be combined into following single state
equation convenient for evaluating a Kalman ﬁlter,8
st = ft + Ftst−1 + vt (26)
where st = [y˜t pit rˆt y˜
e
t+1 y˜
e
t+2 pi
e
t+1 ηy,t ηpi,t r
n
t ut ζy,t ζpi,t]
′ is a vector of state variables, and
vt = [n,t u,t r,t ξy,t ξpi,t] is a vector of all the independently and identically distributed
8Habit formation causes the two period ahead expectation, y˜et+2 to appear in the model, which in turn
requires an evaluating a time t expectation for judgment ηy,t+1. For simplicity, I suppose this judgment is
formed using the mathematical expectation operator on the equations in (25), advanced to period t+1. This
implies that when using judgment for expectations two periods ahead, agents already discount this judgment
depending on the degree of persistence, ρζ,y; and the degree to which stochastic shocks zt impact judgment
two periods ahead is determined by the actual degree of persistence dictated persistence of the natural rate
and cost-push shocks (given by parameters ρn and ρu).
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stochastic shocks. The time-varying component of vector ft and matrix Ft comes from
the coeﬃcients in gˆt and Gˆt determined by the learning process in (23). Since ft and Ft
depend only on lagged realizations of some of the state variables, they can be treated as
predetermined when evaluating the Kalman ﬁlter.
Let GAPt denote the data on the output gap, INFt denote data on inﬂation, FFt denote
data on the Federal Funds Rate, and SPF_GAPt and SPF_INFt denote data on expected
one-quarter ahead output gap and inﬂation rate, respectively, implied by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. The observation equations are given by,
GAPt = 100y˜t,
INFt = pi
∗ + 400pit,
FFt = r
∗ + pi∗ + 400rˆt.
SPF_GAPt = 100y˜
e
t+1,
SPF_INFt = pi
∗ + 400piet+1.
(27)
The state variables are multiplied by 100 to convert decimals to percentages, and the inﬂation
rate, expected inﬂation rate, and federal funds rate are multiplied by 4 to convert quarterly
rates to annualized rates. The New Keynesian model assumes that the steady state inﬂation
rate is equal to zero, but since this is not likely the case in the data, the annualized steady
state inﬂation rate, given by pi∗, is included in the observation equations above. The steady
state gross real interest rate is set equal to the inverse of the discount factor; therefore
r∗ = 400(1− 1/β). These steady state parameters are calibrated to pi∗ = 3.4 and β = 0.9956
so the steady state values match the average inﬂation rate and nominal interest rate in the
sample.
5.2 Initial Conditions
Aside from standard initial conditions for the Kalman ﬁlter, it is necessary to specify initial
conditions for Gˆ∗0 and R0, the initial values for learning process given in equations (21) and
(22). I use pre-sample data from 1954:Q2 through 1968:Q2 on the output gap, inﬂation rate,
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and federal funds rate and and transform these into the same terms as the state vector, xt,
according to,
y˜t =
1
100
GAPt,
pit =
1
400
(INFt − pi∗),
rˆt =
1
400
(FFt − r∗ − pi∗).
I estimate a VAR(1) (the same reduced form as used in the least squared learning process
described in Section 4) on this data using ordinary least squares to set initial values for
the learning matrices. The coeﬃcients from the regression are used to initialize Gˆ∗0, and the
elements from the sum of squares component of the estimate of the variance of the coeﬃcients
is used to initialize R0.
5.3 Bayesian Estimation
Table 1 lists the parameters to be estimated, along with the prior distribution imposed for
Bayesian estimation. The parameters include the learning gain, the parameters of the New
Keynesian Model described in Section 3, the coeﬃcients Φ in equation (25) governing how
stochastic shocks informatively impact judgment, the persistence of stochastic components
to judgment, also in equation (25), and the standard deviation of the structural shocks and
judgment shocks.
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The vector of parameters were drawn from the posterior distribution 400,000 times and the
ﬁrst 100,000 draws were discarded for a burn-in period. Table 1 shows the prior distributions
used for the estimation. The prior distributions for the New Keynesian parameters are similar
to others used in the literature. The prior mean for the learning gain is set to 0.02, with a
rather large standard deviation of 0.03 which allows for a wide range for learning dynamics.
The value of the learning gain two standard deviations above the mean is 0.08, which means
agents econometric estimates evolve very quickly and the approximate sample size agents to
develop their econometric estimates is only 0.08−1 = 12.5 (just over 3 years of data). The
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large standard deviation for the prior on the learning gain also allows for a relatively large
probability that the learning gain is close to zero, implying agents use a very large number
of observations and agents adjust their econometric estimates only very slowly. Finally,
the prior distributions for the coeﬃcients in judgment process are intentionally made very
wide in recognition that no previous literature has attempted to measure or even discuss
such coeﬃcients. The priors for these coeﬃcients are normal with zero mean and standard
deviation equal to 4.0.
6 Results
6.1 Parameters
The prior and posterior distributions for the parameters are listed in Table 2. The last three
columns present the median, 5th percentile and 95th percentile of the posterior distributions
for the parameters. The estimate for the learning gain is found to be 0.0322 with a relatively
tight posterior distribution relative to the prior. This implies that agents use approximately
0.0322−1 = 31.06 observations for forming least squares forecasts, which corresponds to about
7.75 years. This is a magnitude similar to that found by Milani (2007), and Slobodyan and
Wouters (2007) and (2008). Habit formation is found to be a signiﬁcant source of persistence,
with an estimate η = 0.6871. Price indexation is found to be less important in explaining
persistence with an estimate γ = 0.2462. Other signiﬁcant sources of persistence come from
the natural rate shock (ρn = 0.95), cost shock (ρu = 0.78), and the persistence of disturbances
to judgment on output and inﬂation, with ρζ,y = 0.94 and ρζ,pi = 0.89, respectively. Only the
preference parameters σ and µ are poorly identiﬁed by the data; these posterior distributions
largely mirror the priors.
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6.2 Judgment
The posterior distributions for the coeﬃcients in Φ for the judgment process are very sig-
niﬁcantly informed by the data; these posterior distributions are considerably tight given
the very wide prior distributions. Recall the parameters in Φ determine how much judg-
ment depends on actual stochastic shocks. Using equation (25), the variance of judgment
can be decomposed into variance caused by structural parameters (informed judgment) and
variance from the independent stochastic component (judgment shocks) as follows,
V ar(ηt) = ΦV ar(zt)Φ
′ + V ar(ζt). (28)
Both zt and ζt are autoregressive stochastic processes whose variances depend on the vari-
ances for the shocks. To illustrate, the variance for zt can be derived from the variance of the
underlying independently and identically distributed shocks using equation (18) as follows,
V ar(zt) = AV ar(zt−1)A′ + V ar(t)
Since the variance of zt does not depend on time, we can solve for this variance using the
vec() operator on both sides of this equation,
vec(V ar(zt)) = A⊗ Avec(V ar(zt)) + vec(V ar(t)).
Solving leads to the expression,
vec(V ar(zt)) = (I − A⊗ A)−1vec(V ar(t)). (29)
The oﬀ-diagonal elements of V ar(t) are zero, and the diagonal elements are given by squares
of σn, σu, and σr, whose estimates are reported in Table 2. The output vec(V ar(zt)) is then
appropriately re-sized to yield V ar(zt) to substitute into equation (28). A symmetric exercise
performed on the autoregressive equations in (25) yields V ar(ζt).
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Given the estimates for these variances, equation (??) can be used to determine what
percentage of the variability in judgment depends on structural shocks and judgment shocks.
Table 3 reports these results. About 85% of the variability judgment in output is explained
by the variance of the shock to judgment and the remaining 15% of variability is explained
primarily by the variance of the natural rate shock. This implies judgment on output is
primarily ill-informed: only a small amount of judgment is based on information related to
fundamentals in the economy. The second column of Table 3 shows the result is very similar
for judgment regarding inﬂation. About 62% of the judgment in inﬂation is ill-informed, and
the remaining 38% depends on information from the cost shock. The impact of monetary
policy shocks on judgment of both variables was essentially equal to zero.
Its interesting that both the natural rate shock and cost shock help inform judgment, but
strangely, the natural rate shock is not used for judgments regarding inﬂation, and the cost
shock is not used for judgments regarding output. Both of these shocks inﬂuence output and
inﬂation in equilibrium - yet agents mistakenly believe that cost shocks only drive inﬂation,
and natural rate shocks only drive output.
6.3 Impulse Responses
Impulse response functions cannot be computed in quite the same way in models with learn-
ing as models with rational expectations. Learning adds a non-linearity to the model: the
coeﬃcients on the state equation, (26), have a time t subscript which depend on the state of
the state of the learning process, represented by matrices Gˆ∗t and Rt in equations (21) and
(22), respectively. The responses to structural shocks depend on the state of the learning
process and are therefore time-dependent. Moreover, unlike a rational expectations model, a
model with learning evolves absent of any shocks when learning matrices Gˆ∗t and Rt are away
from the rational expectations solution. Expectations continue to evolve with new incoming
data, causing movements in output, inﬂation, and interest rates even when all shocks are
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set equal to zero.9 To identify the impact a shock has in this ever-changing environment, I
simulate the model using the state equation (26) with all shocks for all time periods set to
zero. I then simulate the model with a one standard deviation impulse shock. In the ﬁrst
period only one shock is set equal to its standard deviation and all other shocks are set to
zero for all other time periods. The diﬀerence between these two simulations is the impulse
response function.
Figure 1 shows the responses to the output gap and inﬂation rate from a one standard de-
viation shock to output judgment (ξy,t) and inﬂation judgment (ξpi,t). The impulse responses
show the output gap and inﬂation increase in response to a shock in output judgment. A
positive shock to output judgment means that agents believe there will be higher output in
the future. This judgment is somewhat self fulﬁlling as agents increase their current demand
for consumption, causing the increase in the output gap and also inﬂation.
Close inspection of the three-dimensional impulse responses reveal there are periods in
which the responses to the judgment shocks are relatively more severe. Figure 2 shows an
easier to read, two-dimensional, summary of the impulse response functions over time. For
each time period, the overall size of a single impulse response function is summarized by
a single number by computing the root mean squared response over the ﬁrst four quarters
(dotted line, left-side scale) of the response and again over the ﬁrst sixteen quarters (solid
line, right-side scale) of the response. The plots indicate the responses of a one-standard
deviation output judgment shock were most severe in the recessions of the early 1980s and
early part of the 2000s. The impacts of a one standard deviation inﬂation judgment shock
were more severe over the ﬁrst half of the sample, with spikes occurring during the recessions
in the early 1980s, and following the recessions in 1991 and 2001.
Figure 3 shows the responses to the output gap and inﬂation rate from a one standard
deviation shock to the New Keynesian model structural shocks: natural rate shock, cost
shock, and monetary policy shock. The impulse responses move in the expected direction.
The natural rate shock is subtracted from expected real interest rate in the Euler equation,
9When the model is E-stable and in the neighborhood of the rational expectations solution, then absent
of shocks Gˆ∗t and Rt trend towards the rational expectations solution over time.
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(11), which causes a decrease in desire to save and therefore an increase in demand for
consumption. The impulse response functions therefore show positive responses in the output
gap and inﬂation rate. The cost shock increases the inﬂation rate, also causing a decrease in
the incentive to save and causing a positive response to the output gap. A positive monetary
policy shock is associated with monetary policy tightening, which causes the output gap and
inﬂation rate to decrease in response.
Again, the impulse response functions show the severity from impulses to structural
shocks changes over the sample period. Figure 4 shows the root mean squared impulse
responses over the sample period for the ﬁrst four (dotted line, left-side scale) and sixteen
periods (solid line, right-side scale) following the shock. Like the output judgment shock, the
impact of a one standard deviation natural rate shock is most severe during the recessions
in the early 1980s and again following the recession in 2001. The impact of the cost shock
and monetary policy shock decline over the sample period.
To compare the relative importance of the judgment shocks and structural shocks, Table
4 reports the sample period average of the root mean squared responses illustrated in Figures
1 and 3. The output judgment shock has the largest impulse response on the output gap.
A one standard deviation shock to output judgment has an average (root mean squared)
impact on the output gap equal to 1.3% over the ﬁrst four quarters following the shock, and
1.06% over the ﬁrst sixteen quarters. The next biggest shocks aﬀecting the output gap are
the monetary policy shock and the natural rate shock. The inﬂation judgment shock also
has important impacts on inﬂation four-quarter and sixteen-quarter impulse responses and
are in similar magnitude as the other shocks.
7 Conclusion
Rational expectations is a prominent assumption used in evaluating economic issues analyzed
with DSGE models, but in reality people consider statistical forecasts then use judgment
when forming their actual expectations. I estimate a standard New Keynesian model using
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data on the output gap, inﬂation rate, and interest rates along with data on expectations
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Fundamental structural shocks in the model
include the natural rate shock, cost shock, and monetary policy shock. I allow judgment
to be based on these shocks, indicating judgment can be informed by current fundamental
shocks, but it can also be subject to its own stochastic disturbances that are orthogonal
to current structural shocks and past state variables. Stochastic shocks to judgment is
found to be a signiﬁcant source of economic persistence and economic volatility in U.S.
history. Furthermore, judgment is found to be determined primarily by its own stochastic
disturbances; very little of the variability in judgment is shown to depend on fundamental
shocks.
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Table 3: Judgment Variance Decomposition
Stochastic Shock Judgment Output (%) Judgment Inﬂation (%)
Natural Rate Shock 14.93 0.08
Cost Shock 0.25 38.34
Monetary Policy Shock 0.00 0.00
Output Judgment Shock 84.82 
Inﬂation Judgment Shock  61.58
Total 100.00 100.00
Table 4: Average Root Mean Squared Impulse Responses
First Four Periods of IRF First Sixteen Periods of IRF
Shock Output Gap Inﬂation Output Gap Inﬂation
Natural Rate 0.6018 0.1981 0.9918 0.6533
Cost Shock 0.1697 1.0864 0.1870 0.6953
Monetary Policy 0.6364 0.1787 0.7742 0.4854
Output Judgment 1.2952 0.3662 1.0627 0.6060
Inﬂation Judgment 0.2911 0.3029 0.3353 0.4694
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions: Judgment Shocks
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Output Judgment Shock to Output Judgment Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Inﬂation Judgment Shock to Inﬂation Judgment Shock
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Figure 2: Root Mean Squared Response to Judgment Shocks
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Output Judgment Shock to Output Judgment Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Inﬂation Judgment Shock to Inﬂation Judgment Shock
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions: Structural Shocks
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Natural Rate Shock to Natural Rate Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Cost Shock to Cost Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Monetary Policy Shock to Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 4: Root Mean Squared Response Structural Shocks
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Natural Rate Shock to Natural Rate Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Cost Shock to Cost Shock
Output Gap Response Inﬂation Response
to Monetary Policy Shock to Monetary Policy Shock
